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In October 2007, the Croatian Mine Action Center–Center for Testing Development and Training Ltd. (HCR-CTRO), with assistance from the 
German Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM), test-
ed two sensor systems: the Advanced Landmine Imaging System, devel-
oped by Tohoku University, Japan, and the Gryphon, developed by Tokyo 
Institute for Technology, Japan. Both systems employ commercial metal 
detectors (the ALIS with CEIA MIL-D1 and the Gryphon with Minelab 
F3) and ground-penetrating radar. The metal detector only indicates the 
presence of metal; it cannot determine if the metal is a mine. The GPR in-
dicates objects with a shape that could resemble a mine. The operator of 
the system decides whether to reject the metal clutter. Together, the sys-
by Kazunori Takahashi [ Leibniz Institute for Applied Geophysics ], Mate Gaal [ Federal Institute for Materials 
Research and Testing ] and Dieter Gülle [ Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement ]
Data Analysis and Performance 
Evaluation of Japanese Dual-sensor 
Systems Tested in Croatia
Two years ago, the Croatian Mine Action Center–Center for Testing Development and Training Ltd. tested two 
Japanese dual-sensor systems for humanitarian demining in Croatia. The test’s results show that these detection 
systems can potentially increase the accuracy of mine-detecting operations, but several improvements to the 
sensors may be required before the systems are fully effective. 
tems improve the productivity of demining operations.1,2,3 This article dis-
cusses the test’s results, the systems’ performances and the data analysis.
Test Conditions
The complete report, detailing the conditions, procedures and results 
of the two dual-sensor systems is available online.4 The test was carried 
out at the Benkovac test site in Croatia where previous metal-detector tri-
als have taken place, such as the Systematic Test and Evaluation of Metal 
Detector (STEMD) trial.5 Three soils are available at this site: red bauxite 
(Lane 1), neutral clay (Lane 3), and red bauxite with neutral stones (Lane 
5, local soil), as shown in the figures on the next page.6,7 
The Gryphon dual-sensor system evaluated in the test. The Gryphon team consists of two buggies: one with a metal detector (near 
side) and one with GPR (far side).
ALL PHOTOS AnD GRAPHICS COURTESY OF THE AUTHORS
Lane 1: red bauxite. Lane 3: neutral clay. Lane 5: red bauxite with neutral stones.
Table 1: Differences in categorization of sources of alarms for stand-alone met-
al detectors and dual sensors.
*1 The metal-detector scan in ALIS is performed in the conventional manner (i.e., manual scan with sound alert), while the metal detector on Gryphon 
is scanned by the robot arm and the detection is according to visual interpretations of the metal-detector image. 
*2 Scans of the GPR in ALIS are performed for each metal-detector alarm. Gryphon scans both sensors for an area approx. 1 x 2m at once and interpre-
tations are done for each scanned area, i.e., Gryphon scans all the area with both sensors.
Figure 1: Operation procedure of the dual-sensor systems.
Blind tests were conducted in these lanes with real, ren-
dered-safe mines (11 were PMA-2 and nine were PMA-3 
mines) and metal clutter. The target layout was the same 
as that in the International Test and Evaluation Program 
for Humanitarian Demining STEMD trial5 with addition-
al small pieces of various metals (nine per lane) placed on 
the ground surface. Thus, each lane comprised a total of 38 
buried targets.
Sources of true 
positives
Sources of false positives
Stand alone metal detector mines, metals soil
Metal detector as 
part of dual sensor mines metals, soil
1
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Three deminers from the Croatian Mine Action Center served as 
operators of the ALIS; the developer had trained them together 10 
workdays prior to the test. In the test, each deminer went through 
each of the three lanes once. The developer’s team of five to six per-
sons operated the Gryphon.
Both dual-sensor systems employ a metal detector as a primary sen-
sor and a GPR as a secondary sensor; the metal detector first detects all 
the metal objects, and then the GPR identifies objects suspected to be 
landmines. In the test, red markers indicated positions of objects detect-
ed by the metal detector and yellow markers indicated positions of ob-
jects confirmed as landmines by the GPR, so that those detections could 
be classified later. The operation procedure is schematically illustrated 
in Figure 1 on the previous page. 
After each run, all the markers’ positions were measured and com-
pared to the real positions of mines measured when they were planted. A 
circular area around a target, called a halo, is defined according to CWA 
14747-1:2003.8 A marker is considered a hit (true positive) if it falls into 
the area, and a marker is counted as a false alarm (false positive) if it is 
placed outside the area. A target with no markers in its halo is counted 
as a miss (false negative).
Data Analysis
Probability of detection has been commonly used to evaluate perfor-
mance of metal detectors. Since the dual sensors employ two kinds of de-
tection, two kinds of POD can be defined. The POD for a metal detector is 
defined as: 
where              and             denote the number of mines buried and the 
number of mines detected by the metal detector, respectively. The other 
POD for GPR is defined as:
where          is number of mines correctly confirmed after the use of 
the metal detector and the GPR. Metal-detector alarms not caused by 
mines and GPR alarms incorrectly confirmed as mines are considered 
false calls for a dual sensor. Therefore, the false-alarm rates for the metal 
detector and for the GPR, respectively, are defined as:
where                ,              ,               and               are alarm numbers caused 
by metal and soil, reported by the metal detector and the GPR, and A 
denotes an area searched. Note that the definition of the false alarm for 
metal detectors in this analysis is different from that of stand-alone met-
al detectors. Alarms from metal pieces are normally counted as true 
positives for stand-alone metal detectors, while they are considered false 
positives for dual sensors because of the detectors’ objective, which is to 
differentiate between landmines and other objects. The different catego-
rizations of alarms are summarized in Table 1. 
In order to observe how much efficiency is improved, FAR reduction, 
     , is introduced as follows:
If all the false alarms are rejected,              takes a value 1.
The GPR could fail to detect mines. It can be acceptable to miss false 
alarms; however, miss-discrimination for mines threatens the lives of 
end-users. In order to see the frequency of missed mines, probability of 
detection reduction,             , is defined as:
If the GPR does not reject any mines found by the metal detector, 
the value becomes 0. Related to the reduction, the discrimination ratio 
for mines is introduced to find how often mines are correctly confirmed.
The ratio is actually given by one minus POD reduction:  
Confidence limits of 95% of POD, FAR and their reductions are pro-
vided in Figures 2 and 3 (see page 68) to illustrate the accuracy of the es-
timations. They are calculated assuming the binomial and the Poisson 
distributions for POD and FAR, respectively.9,10,11
In the following section, the defined quantities above are incorporat-
ed into various figures that display the results of the dual-sensor system 
performance evaluations.
Results
Although performances of metal detectors and GPRs can be quite dif-
ferent in various types of soil, the results in the three lanes are analyzed to-
gether in this article to show the overview. An analysis of each soil can be 
found in the trial report.4 The ALIS operator whose results differed greatly 
from the others had his results excluded as an outlier.
Figure 2 (see page 68) shows the receiver-operating-characteristic dia-
gram in which probability of detections are plotted against false-alarm 
rates and the 95% confidence limits. Each device has two plots, one from 
using only the metal detector (primary sensor) and one from using both 
sensors (metal detector and GPR). It can be observed that the FARs by 
metal detectors (squares) are shifted toward the left by using GPRs (cir-
cles), meaning that FARs are reduced significantly. However, at the same 
time, reductions of PODs also occur for both devices, which should not 
happen for safety reasons.
The absolute levels of POD and FAR are basically given by the metal 
detectors, which are commercial ones in both systems. The reductions of 
FAR and POD can be seen as contributions of the GPR. The reductions 
are plotted in Figure 3. In this figure, FAR reductions are plotted with 
respect to POD reductions; therefore an ideal dual-sensor system that 
can perfectly discriminate targets gives a plot on the upper left portion 
of the graph. If a system uses random chance to determine whether a 
mine is present, the plot lies on the diagonal line. Both the ALIS and the 
Gryphon give plots above the diagonal line, therefore the GPRs in both 
systems are contributing to the decision-making. The Gryphon gives 
larger FAR reduction than the ALIS; however, the POD reduction is also 
larger than that by the ALIS. The difference in the POD reductions is not 
Figure 2: Receiver-operating-characteristic diagram with 
95% confidence limits for each device.
Figure 3: FAR reduction versus POD reduction for each device.
Figures 4a and 4b: POD given by the metal detector (solid lines) 
and by both sensors (dotted lines), and discrimination ratio for 
mines (dotted-broken lines) with respect to target burial depths, 
given by the ALIS (top) and the Gryphon (bottom).
The ALIS dual-sensor system evaluated in the test. 
2
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In 2007, the Director of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Tech-nologies received a request to investigate a potentially promising 
heat-treatment process to extend the operational life of humanitarian-
deminer visors through removal of scratches from the field of view. The 
heat-treatment procedure was developed by undergraduate students 
as part of a product-design course and was published in The Journal 
of Mine Action.3 The authors of that article noted that further testing 
would be required to determine whether the visor properties were ad-
versely affected by the scratch-repair procedure. In order to allow for 
Blast Testing of Visors Used for 
Humanitarian Demining  
by Captain Charlene Fawcett [ DRDC Suffield ]
This article discusses experimental results from blast testing of Security Devices Ltd. polycarbonate visors used 
by humanitarian deminers. Visors used in the blast testing fell into one of three categories: new visors, manually 
scratched visors, and scratched and heat-gun-repaired visors. Results show that the visors in all three categories 
failed to meet the draft international standard for blast testing1 relevant at the time, that further research is 
required to establish pressure profiles for the standard charge size being tested, and that the proposed heat- 
treatment method does appear to degrade the blast resistance of the visor used in the test.2 
an independent assessment of the technique, the authors provided a 
detailed outline of the procedure in the article that readers could fol-
low independently. 
Trial Objectives and Methodology
The objective of this research was to assess the blast and ballistic per-
formance of deminer visors before and after heat treatment. To ensure 
compatibility with the original student project, the same type of visors 
were obtained from Security Devices Ltd.
Figure 1: Testing platform and positioning rig.
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so significant considering the 95% confidence 
limit, but devices for demining must avoid the 
POD reduction as much as possible. The re-
sults suggest that the Gryphon can reduce FAR 
more than the ALIS can. However, the abso-
lute level of FARs is almost the same as shown 
in Figure 2 (see page 68) and the larger FAR re-
duction is due to a larger number of false alarms 
given by the metal detector implemented in the 
Gryphon. Therefore, performances of the whole 
system as dual sensor in terms of FAR can be 
characterized as almost the same.
Figure 4 (see page 69) shows probability of 
detections given by the metal detector and by 
both sensors, along with the discrimination 
ratio with respect to depth for each device. 
As the theory in the Das and McFee article12 
states and former trials verified, the PODs giv-
en by the metal detectors are decreasing with 
depth. Since the GPRs are always used after 
the metal detectors, the PODs used by the 
dual sensors cannot exceed those by the met-
al detectors. It can be observed that the PODs 
by both sensors positively correlate with the 
PODs by the metal detectors.
Furthermore, discrimination ratios tend 
to increase with depth in these results. This 
fact cannot be determined conclusively be-
cause the number of mines belonging to each 
depth class is small and the estimation would 
not be sufficiently accurate. This tendency sup-
ports a common theory that GPR has difficul-
ties in detecting shallowly buried targets since 
reflections from the ground surface mask 
those from targets.13 However, this observed 
tendency is not as strong as expected; both 
systems achieved about 0.7 of the discrimina-
tion ratio at the depth range from 0–3cm, so 
the theory cannot clearly be confirmed. This 
may be because both sensors measured data 
of GPR as images in terms of horizontal slice 
and this type of representation may be good at 
depicting small changes close to the surface, 
unlike only one-time signals or a vertical slice.
Conclusions and Discussion
The results of the test campaign for the 
dual-sensor systems tell us that those sys-
tems reduced false-alarm rates significantly by 
more than one-half. However, the systems also 
reduced probability of detections, which must 
be avoided in real clearance operations. Useful-
ness of the dual sensors may strongly depend 
on improvements with POD.
The full report4 stated that the three de-
miners who worked on the ALIS achieved 
different results in terms of POD, FAR and 
working hours. The variation may be caused 
by the way the deminers interpret the output 
of the sensor and make decisions when oper-
ating the ALIS. The visual interpretation of 
images and decision-making process are en-
tirely subject to the operators themselves. In 
order to avoid unstable and/or unexpected re-
sults, further developments/improvements, 
such as an automatic-recognition algorithm, 
are recommended.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to use 
stand-alone metal detectors at the same time 
as a benchmark, making a direct comparison 
of dual sensors to stand-alone metal detectors 
unavailable. However, one can roughly com-
pare the detectors to those from the STEMD 
trial,5 taking into account additional metals. 
The ALIS and the Gryphon needed approxi-
mately five and nine minutes, respectively, to 
survey an average of one square meter. It can 
be roughly estimated that the ALIS may be two 
to three times slower and the Gryphon may 
be four to five times slower than stand-alone 
metal detectors.14 Even if the search speed in 
this test is slower than for a stand-alone met-
al detector, it is possible that these dual sen-
sors would accelerate the clearance operation 
in total, because rejected alarms from metals 
would reduce the need for excavation or could 
be rapidly excavated. Increased search speed 
would also multiply these benefits. 
Another dual-sensor trial in Germany was 
carried out in September 2009 by the Interna-
tional Test and Evaluation Program for Hu-
manitarian Demining and led by the German 
Federal Office of Defense Technology and Pro-
curement.15 The results are being analyzed and 
we hope that a more detailed evaluation of dual-
sensor performance will be available soon. 
The authors acknowledge Mr. N. Pavković 
and Mr. T. V. B. Vondracek from HCR-CTRO 
for managing the test. We also thank the devel-
opers and deminers that participated.
See Endnotes, Page 79
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